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ABSTRACT: This Article explores the Constitution’s minimum age qualifications for President, 
Vice President, and Congress. It presents a new feminist account in support of the minimum age 
requirements that is grounded in empirical data about the later entry of women in politics. The 
data suggests women delay entry into politics, and this delay affects their ability to gain future 
leadership positions. In light of this data, this Article argues the Constitution’s minimum age 
qualifications serve an important egalitarian function for women when read through the lens of 
the Nineteenth Amendment, which illuminates the importance of promoting and protecting 
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Women have long faced obstacles in their efforts to gain political representation. A 
glance the current top elected officials in the United States reveals a deep gender disparity. In 
2013, women held 18.2% of the seats in the House of Representatives, and 20% of the seats in 
the Senate.1 But these statistics could be even lower without an important egalitarian feature of 
the Constitution: minimum age qualifications. The Constitution outlines minimum age 
qualifications to serve as President, Vice President, and in Congress. Political groups and 
scholars alike have advocated for the elimination of these qualifications, claiming they subvert 
democracy and discriminate against younger aspiring politicians under the Due Process and 
Equal Protection Clauses.  
However, this Article argues the Constitution’s minimum age qualifications continue to 
provide an important protection for one group of political candidates: women. Historically and 
currently, women enter politics at older ages than their male counterparts, often waiting to start 
their political careers until their children leave the home. Female federal legislators entering 
politics under the age of 40 are rare, and a delay in any candidate’s taking office has effects on 
their ability to gain power and future positions in Congress and the Executive branch.  
This Article argues that one unintended potential effect of the minimum age 
qualifications is a more egalitarian environment for female political candidates. Abolishment of 
                                                 
1 Women in Elective Office 2013, Center for American Women and Politics, available at 
http://www.cawp.rutgers.edu/fast_facts/levels_of_office/documents/elective.pdf.  Overall, this amounts to women 
holding 99 of the 535 seats in the 113th Congress, for an overall percentage of 18.5% of the seats. Id. 
Congresswoman Nancy Pelosi, who was the Speaker of the House, currently serves as the minority leader. 
The low numbers of women in politics are particularly glaring when placed in context: whereas the early 1990s 
experienced an increase of women in elected office, the last several election cycles can be characterized as a plateau. 
The 2010 congressional elections resulted in the first net decrease in the percentage of women serving in the U.S. 
House of Representatives since the 1978 midterm elections. The small gains for women in the 2012 elections were 
also especially low given that 2012 was a redistricting year that presented relatively more electoral opportunities and 
open seats than is typically the case.  See Jennifer Lawless & Richard Fox, Girls Just Wanna Not Run: The Gender 
Gap in Young Americans’ Political Ambitions 1, 23 n. 3 (2013), available at 
http://www.american.edu/spa/wpi/upload/Girls-Just-Wanna-Not-Run_Policy-Report.pdf.   
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the age qualifications would be disproportionately to the detriment of women political 
candidates. Just as the age qualifications ensured at the time of the nation’s Founding that 
“favorite sons” of wealthy men or politicians did not receive an` advantage in running for 
political office earlier, the age qualifications today continue to promote more equal access to 
political office and Congressional leadership for all sons and daughters. These constitutional age 
qualifications fit into the larger democratic, egalitarian pattern of our Constitution, especially 
when read through the lens of the Nineteenth Amendment and women’s political 
enfranchisement.  
II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL SETTING: MINIMUM AGE QUALIFICATIONS 
FOR FEDERAL ELECTED OFFICE 
 
A. The Constitution and Age 
As a textual matter, the Constitution sets age, citizenship, and inhabitancy qualifications 
for those holding public office, while eschewing proposed religious and property requirements.  
In terms of age requirements, the United States Constitution explicitly addresses age 
qualifications for holding public office in four instances. Both the President and Vice President 
must be at least 35 years old to hold office. The constitutional provisions prescribing the 
President’s qualifications are outlined in Article II, Section 1, clause 5 of the Constitution, which 
declares, “[N]either shall any Person be eligible to that Office who shall not have attained to the 
Age of thirty five Years...”2 Similarly, for the Vice Presidency, the Twelfth Amendment 
specifies that “no person constitutionally ineligible to the office of President shall be eligible to 
that of Vice-President….”3  
The Constitution also outlines minimum qualifications for members of the Legislature, 
detailing that Senators must be at least 30 years old: “No Person shall be a Senator who shall not 
                                                 
2 U.S. CONST. art. 2, § 1. 
3 U.S. CONST. amend. 16. 
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have attained to the Age of thirty Years…”4 Lastly, the Constitution requires Representatives to 
be at least 25 years old: “No Person shall be a Representative who shall not have attained to the 
Age of twenty five Years…”5 Although the Constitution sets minimum age qualifications for 
these offices, upper age limits have never been established.6 At the time of the drafting and 
ratification of the Constitution, many state constitutions contained minimum age requirements, 
and likely served as exemplars during the drafting of the Constitution.7  
The deliberations of the delegates at the Constitutional Convention of 1787 furnish few 
clues to explain the setting of these specific minimum age lines. The Drafters debated the age 
qualifications for Representatives during the Convention.8 George Mason, of Virginia, 
successfully argued that the minimum age for Representatives should be 25, suggesting that “21-
                                                 
4 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 3. 
5 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 2. This Qualifications Clause was altered by the Committee of Style prior to submission to 
the states.  Originally, the clause read, “Every Member of the House of Representatives shall be of the age of 
twenty-five years at least; shall have been a citizen of the United States  for at least seven years before his election; 
and shall be, at the time of his election, an inhabitant of the State in which he shall be chosen.” Although the final 
clause was not substantively different, the Committee of Style ultimately phrased the clause negatively: “No person 
shall be a Representative who shall not have attained to the age of twenty-five years…” 2 THE RECORDS OF THE 
FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 565 (Max Farrand ed., 1966). 
6 The Constitution also sets no age qualifications for Article III judges. James F. Ianelli, The Sound of Silence: 
Eligibility Qualifications and Article III, 6 SETON HALL CIRCUIT REV. 55 (2009).  (“[T]he historical record provides 
no direct explanation for the Article III omission of eligibility requirements.”). Id. at 56. 
7 Of the original thirteen colonies, four state constitutions (Maryland, Delaware, North Carolina, and Virginia) 
included minim age requirements for public office. See MD. CONST. §XXX (1776) (setting a minimum of twenty-
five years old for Governor), available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/17th_century/ma02.asp; DEL. CONST. art. IV, IX 
(1776) (setting a minimum of twenty-five years of age for members of “[t]he council”), available at 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/de02.asp; N.C. CONST. §XV (1776) (setting a minimum of thirty years for 
Governor), available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/nc07.asp; VA. CONST. art. IV (1776) (setting a 
minimum of twenty-five years old for Senators), available at http://www.nhinet.org/ccs/docs/va-1776.htm. Although 
other states set age minimums for holding office at the voting age, these eligibility requirements did not differ from 
the requirements to vote, so were unlike the Constitution’s age qualifications at the time. See, e.g., GA. CONST. art. 
VI, IX (1777) (setting a minimum of twenty one years of age to both vote and hold political office in Georgia), 
available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/ga02.asp.  
States, however, are prevented from adding any additional requirements to qualifications for federal office as 
outlined in the Constitution. In U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, the Supreme Court ruled that states cannot limit 
terms for their own members of Congress because the Qualifications Clauses of the United States Constitution 
prohibit states from adding any restriction on candidacy that amounts to a “qualification.”  514 U.S. 779, 836 
(1995). The Court explained that when the Framers drafted the Constitution, and when it was ratified by the states, 
the intent of all participants was to prohibit states from adding further qualifications to those enumerated in Articles  
I and II, which require only that a candidate have attained a minimum age, be a United States citizen, and be an 
inhabitant of the state. Id. 
 
8 See 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 375 (M. Farrand ed. 1966) (Madison’s notes). 
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year-olds did not possess sufficient maturity to serve in the House, as their political beliefs were 
“too crude and erroneous to merit influence on public opinions.”9 Arguing against the 25 year 
old age requirement, James Wilson, of Pennsylvania, suggested it would “damp the effects of 
genius and of laudable ambition” declaring there was “no more reason for incapacitating youth 
than age.”10 Ultimately, with a vote of 7 “ayes” and 3 “nays”, the 25-year-old minimum age for 
Representatives made it into the draft of the Constitution, as did the other age requirements 
(those without deliberation at the Convention).11   
James Madison set forth similar reasons in Federalist Paper No. 62 to explain why a 
higher minimum age of 30 should be required to serve in the U.S. Senate as opposed to the 
House of Representatives. He explained that “Senatorial trust” requires a “greater extent of 
information and stability of character” that could only be realized with age.12 Just as the age 
requirements give aspiring candidates time to develop information and stability of character, they 
also give the electorate time to discover any dangerous personal traits those individuals might 
possess. Similarly, Professor Akhil Amar notes Convention Delegate Tench Coxe’s argument 
that America’s president “cannot be an ideot, [and] probably not a knave or tyrant, for those 
whom nature makes so discover [i.e., reveal] it before the age of thirty-five, until which period 
he cannot be elected.”13   
                                                 
9 Id. 
10 Id. 
11 Id. On the question of inserting the “25 years of age” requirement for Representatives, the states in favor of the 
clause were Connecticut, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, and South Carolina. 
Massachusetts, Georgia, and Pennsylvania voted against the age requirement, and New York remained divided. Id. 
12 THE FEDERALIST NO. 62 (James Madison); See also THE FEDERALIST NO. 57 (James Madison) (“The aim of every 
political constitution is, or ought to be, first to obtain for rulers men who possess most wisdom to discern, and most 
virtue to pursue, the common good of the society; and in the next place, to take the most effectual precautions for 
keeping them virtuous whilst they continue to hold their public trust.”). 
 
13 AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY, 160-161 (2006) (citing Tench Coxe, An 
Examination of the Constitution (I), in Ford, Pamphlets, 133, 137-38). 
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Today, these same rationales of both maturity and developing political information and 
beliefs that the Founders invoked for minimum age requirements are largely accepted as reasons 
to continue to require a minimum age for federal office. The practical purpose of these age 
requirements is to ensure suitably mature and informed federal public officials. These minimum 
age qualifications have remained unchanged since the Constitution’s ratification. Since the 
Founding, Presidents, Senators, and members of the House of Representatives have had to meet 
the same age requirements.  The only change to the minimum age requirements arose with the 
Twelfth Amendment’s specification that Vice Presidents require the same eligibility 
requirements as the office of the President.14 However, some question whether the Constitution 
should continue to require older public officials as a means of ensuring informed and mature 
politicians, and have engaged in efforts to abolish the Constitution’s minimum age requirements.  
B. Attempts to Remove the Constitution’s Minimum Age Qualifications 
From today’s vantage point in history, many have questioned the propriety of the 
Constitution’s unchanged age qualifications. They allege discrimination or ageism against more 
youthful candidates.15 They assert that this “discrimination” is anti-democratic in nature because 
it limits the field of candidates from which voters can choose, thereby restricting the voters’ 
ability to cast an effective ballot.16 In this way, the constitutional age requirements violate the 
equal protection clause. They additionally burden the right of voters and candidates to associate 
under the First Amendment for advancement of political beliefs, as the state board of elections 
                                                 
14 Voter and Officeholder Qualifications, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2230, 2236 (2006). 
15 See, e.g., ANDREW LERNER, THANK YOU FOR BEING YOUNG 64 (2011) (“If the top of the legal pyramid 
discriminates against you, what about the building blocks of our legal system? Age of candidacy limits in the 
Constitution give credence to other federal laws that discriminate by age. Federal precedent supports local-level age 
of candidacy laws.”). Id. 
 
16 Lawrence Bemis, Comment: Age and Durational Residency Requirements as Qualifications for Candidacy: A 
Violation of Equal Protection 1973 U. ILL. L.F 161, 177-79 (1973). 
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can essentially prohibit the candidate of a voter’s choice from being allowed to seek public 
office.17 
Political groups have attempted to overturn the constitutional age qualifications through 
both political advocacy and litigation. As early as the 1970s, the Socialist Workers Party 
repeatedly nominated candidates too young to qualify for the offices they were running for in an 
effort to abolish minimum age requirements for elected office.18 To advocate for these underage 
candidates, the Socialist Workers Party also initiated lawsuits alleging constitutional violations 
based on this alleged restriction of voter choice. For example, in the early 1970s, the Socialist 
Workers Party brought a lawsuit seeking injunctive relief to challenge a state electoral board’s 
denying of one such underage federal candidate.19 The federal district court held that a state’s 
refusal to certify political party candidates who do not meet the minimum age requirements of 
the Constitution violates no constitutional rights.20 Similarly, the Ninth Circuit will soon hear 
oral arguments in February 2014 in a case alleging the state should have listed a twenty-seven 
year old candidate on the Peace and Freedom Party’s primary ballot in the 2012 election.21 The 
Peace and Freedom Party allege in their complaint that refusal to place the underage candidate 
                                                 
17 Id.  
18 K. L. BHATIA, TEXTBOOK ON LEGAL LANGUAGE AND LEGAL WRITING 118-19 (2010). In 1972, Linda Jenness ran 
as the Socialist Workers Party presidential candidate at age 31, but was not able to receive ballot access in several 
States due to her age. Again in 2004, the Socialist Workers Party nominated 28-year-old Arrin Hawkins as the 
Party’s vice-presidential candidate, and again she did not receive ballot access in several states. Id. 
19 Socialist Workers Party of Illinois v. Ogilvie, 357 F. Supp. 109 (N.D. Ill. 1972). The Socialist Workers Party was 
also active on the state court level for advocating against minimum age requirements in state constitutions. See, e.g., 
Raza Unida Party v. Bullock, 349 F. Supp. 1272, 1282 (W.D. Tex. 1972) aff’d in part, vacated in part sub nom 
(challenging the constitutionality of the age and residency requirements for Texas state executive offices imposed by 
Article IV, §§ 4 & 16 of the Texas Constitution based on theories of equal protection and First Amendment freedom 
of association, petition, and speech). Id. at 1282-83. 
20 Id. at 113 (“Under the circumstances present here, no due process rights of Plaintiffs under the Fourteenth 
Amendment were violated by Defendants’ actions in refusing to certify the Socialist Workers Party for a place on 
the 1972 Illinois general election ballot because of the admitted age…”)  
 
21 Richard Winger, Ninth Circuit Will Hear Peace & Freedom Presidential Primary Case on February 13, 
2014(Dec. 18, 2013), http://www.ballot-access.org/2013/12/ninth-circuit-will-hear-peace-freedom-presidential-
primary-case-on-february-13-2014. In the case, the U.S. District Court ruled that because the candidate admits she 
does not meet the qualifications, the Secretary of State was correct to keep her off the ballot. Id. 
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on the ballot for President violated the Due Process Clause, Equal Protection Clause, and First 
Amendment.22 
In addition to political parties and activist groups, legal scholars too have suggested the 
discriminatory nature of the Constitution’s minimum age qualifications, making similar 
arguments for the unconstitutionality of the age qualifications. Professor Anthony D’Amato 
outlines that there is a “good constitutional argument” for permitting an underage President.23 He 
contends that every provision of the Constitution is subject to amendment, and the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments qualify and modify the original age qualifications.24 Specifically, age 
discrimination-in a matter that restricts the right of the people to elect a President of their own 
choosing would “clearly violate the due process clause of the fifth amendment, and the due 
process and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment.”25 Professor D’Amato thus 
argues the provision requiring the President to be thirty-five years old “sets up an 
unconstitutional discrimination against younger persons based on an irrational age limit, and is 
therefore a nullity.”26 Although his argument is specific to the Presidency, the same reasoning 
could be applied to Members of Congress based on the age qualifications of Article I, suggesting 
those limitations too are irrational nullities.  
Other legal scholars have also questioned whether the minimum age qualifications of the 
Constitution are truly hard and fast rules, or more malleable standards that can be manipulated. 
For example, Professor Gary Peller argues the age requirements of the Constitution could be 
interpreted as signifying to the Framers “a certain level of maturity rather than some intrinsically 
                                                 
22 The Peace and Freedom Party, Peta Lindsay, and Richard Becker, Plaintiffs, v. Debra Bowen, in her official 
capacity as Secretary of State of California, Defendant., 2012 WL 1108796 (E.D. Cal.). 
23 Anthony D’Amato, Aspects of Deconstruction: The “Easy Case” of the Under-Aged President, 84 NW. U. L. REV. 
250, 254 (1989). 
24 Id. 




significant number of years.”27 Therefore, if a presidential candidate was mature for his age, but 
under 35 years old, he could still be placed on the ballot and elected. Similarly, Professor 
Girardeau Spann suggests “the governing principle is that Presidents should possess a minimum 
degree of maturity and experience” and the “principle may best be advanced by ignoring the rule 
in the case of a particularly precocious thirty-four year old.”28 In this way, the constitutional age 
qualifications can be seen as guidelines that allow “underage” candidates to run for office on a 
case-by-case basis when they are sufficiently mature. 
The common thread between these political groups and legal scholars is that all see the 
minimum age requirements as irrational and anti-democratic. They contend that the 
Constitution’s minimum age requirements hinder the election process in a way that limits voter 
and candidate choice, and therefore these provisions of the Constitution are blatantly 
unconstitutional themselves. However, this Article suggests that such critics and opponents of 
the minimum age qualifications are wholly incorrect. Rather, today the minimum age 
qualifications of Articles I and II can be seen as serving an important egalitarian function that is 
essential to our republican form of government.  
III. A MODERN EGALITARIAN APPROACH TO MINIMUM AGE 
QUALIFICATIONS: PROTECTING FEMALE LEADERSHIP IN POLITICS 
 
Of course, any qualification for holding office naturally restricts voter choice in some 
manner. What matters is whether the purposes that the minimum age restrictions serve outweigh 
any possible infringement on democratic legitimacy and voter choice. Instead of viewing the 
minimum age qualifications as anti-democratic constitutional “bugs”, the age requirements can 
instead be viewed as constitutional features that promote a broader, more diverse democratic 
culture of merit. The minimum age qualifications provide an egalitarian safety net for one very 
                                                 
27 Gary Peller, The Metaphysics of American Law, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 1151, 1174 (1985). 
28 Girardeau Spann, Deconstructing the Legislative Veto, 68 MINN. L. REV. 473, 532-33 (1984). 
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specific underrepresented group of individuals in politics: women. Because women are more 
likely to enter politics later in life than their male contemporaries, often due to family-related 
concerns, the minimum age requirements encourage more equal political participation at the 
federal level. Earlier entry into politics equals with greater party and congressional authority, so 
the age qualifications prevent younger men from disproportionately eclipsing qualified female 
candidates who run for office later in life.  
A. Age and Entry into Federal Office 
The Constitution’s minimum age requirements are particularly salient for female 
candidates and politicians because as a general pattern, women tend to be older than men when 
they first run for office.29 This general trend of women’s later entry into political office remains 
true for the current 113th Congress. In the 113th Congress, the average age at which members of 
the House took office was slightly over 47 years old.30 However, there is a significant difference 
between the average ages for male and female members. The average age when women 
politicians first took their congressional oath of office for the House of Representatives is 50.2 
years old, whereas the average for their male counterparts is 46.7 years old.31 A similar pattern 
existed for the 112th Congress: although the average age for members of the House first taking 
office was 46.9 years old, the average age for women was 49.5 years.32 On the other hand, the 
average age for men was 46.3.33 Likewise, of those Senators who were new to the 113th 
                                                 
29 See, e.g., BARBARA PALMER & DENNIS SIMON, BREAKING THE POLITICAL GLASS CEILING: WOMEN AND 
CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS 68 (2008). 
30 E-mail from Kelly Dittmar, Assistant Research Professor at the Center for American Women and Politics 
(CAWP) at Rutgers University, to author (September 23, 2013) (on file with author). Professor Dittmar was kind 
enough to provide her empirical data detailing various factors related to age and gender of members of Congress in 
the 112th and 113th Congresses, along with data about the number of children each had under the age of 18. Professor 
Dittmar’s data is the only current comprehensive dataset detailing age disparities between the genders in Congress.  






Congress, the average age of first taking office was 53.9.34 However, the average age of first-
time female Senators was 59 years old, compared to only 50 years for men.35  
These gender-significant age divides can be seen more prominently by analyzing the 
percentage of members of Congress who took federal office at age 40 or under. In the 113th 
Congress, only 19% of female members in the 113th Congress took office at age 40 or under, 
compared to 25% of male members.36 These figures are not surprising given that in the entire 
history of Congress, only thirty-eight women under forty years old have served in the House.37 
Likewise, only one woman under the age of forty has been elected to the Senate: Blanche 
Lambert Lincoln (D-AR) ran in 1998 at the age of thirty eight.38   
This current data on gender-significant age gaps in the 112-113th Congresses, 
summarized in Tables 1 and 2 below, confirms that women today continue to enter federal 
legislative office systemically later than their male colleagues, especially in the House of 
Representatives. 
  
                                                 
34 Id. 
35 Id. 
36 Id. All but nine of these have been elected since 1972. Id. 




Table 1: House of Representatives39 









Average Current Age 58.1   56.3 
Women 59.9   58.5 
Men 57.8   55.8 
   
Average Age Taking Office 46.9 49.92 47.4 
Women 49.5 52.7 50.2 
Men 46.3 49.1 46.7 
  
Members 40 or under (Current Age) 24   38 
Women 3   6 
Men 21   32 
% All Women who are 40 or under 4.10%   7.70% 
% All Men who are 40 or under 5.80%   9.00% 
   
Members Taking Office at 40 or under 107 17 103 
Women 14 3 15 
Men 93 14 88 
% All Women who were 40 or under 19% 15.79% 19.20% 
% All Men who were 40 or under 26% 21.88% 24.60% 
 









    
Average Age Taking Office 50.9 53.9 51.2 
Women 48.2 59 51 
Men 51.4 50 51.2 
   
Members Taking Office at 40 or under 8 1  7 
Women 0 0  0 
Men 8 1  7 
% All Women who were 40 or under 0% 0% 0% 
% All Men who were 40 or under 9.60% 14.29%  8.43% 
 
                                                 
39 As of November 2013. 
40 As of November 2013. 
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These recent statistics of the 112th and 113th Congresses echo other recent sessions of 
Congress as well, indicating the figures are not anomalies. For example, in the 110th Congress 
(2007 session), the average age of male House members when they first ran for office was 44.9, 
whereas the average for female House members was again higher, at 47.9.41 These specific 
statistics regarding individual sessions of Congress likewise echo the general pattern of women 
being elected to Congress later in life: of all women to serve in the House between 1916 and 
2006, the average age when they first ran for office was 48.6.42 
This gender imbalance of age upon entry into politics is also consistent with state 
legislators as well. In a 2001 study, the Center for American Women and Politics found that only 
24 percent of women legislators were under age 50, compared with 39 percent of their male 
counterparts.43 In addition, on average, a woman serving as a state senator in 2001 started in that 
position at age 50, and the average age of entry for women state representatives was 49.44 Men 
were significantly more likely than women to begin serving at a relatively young age.45 About 
three in ten male state senators (28%) and state representatives (30%) entered those positions 
when they were 40 or younger.46 Comparatively for women, only 11% of women state senators 
and 14% of women state representatives entered those positions when they were under 40 years 
old.47 
B. “House” Responsibilities vs. Home Responsibilities: Congresswomen, 
Children, and Families 
 
                                                 
41 PALMER & SIMON, supra note 29, at 75. 
42 Id. at 75.  
43 Women in State Legislatures: Past, Present, Future, Center for American Women and Politics, Eagleton Institute 









Although it is not uncommon today for female members of Congress to be mothers, very 
few of them have young children. One reason attributed to female candidates’ delayed entrance 
compared to male candidates is that women usually wait until their children are grown before 
they run for office.48 Women seem to delay their political careers because of family 
responsibilities, and are far less likely to have young children in office.49  
This general pattern again is consistent with the data from the 113th Congress. Of the 84 
new members of the 113th House of Representatives (65 male, 19 female), 32 men and only 1 
woman currently have children under age 18.50 In other words, half of the freshman male 
members are elected while they still have young children at home. However, all but one of the 
new female members of Congress has either no children or only adult children. Similar statistics 
can be seen with new members of the Senate. Of the 7 male freshman Senators, 4 of them have 
children under the age of 18.  Yet of the 5 freshman women Senators, none have minor 
children.51  
These statistics tied to minor children illustrate the domestic limitations for many female 
candidates, and begin to explain why women may not enter politics as early as men. Anecdotally, 
Nancy Pelosi illustrates the importance of statistics, explaining how she entered politics late in 
life due to her responsibilities as a mother affected her seniority in Congress: 
I came to Congress when my youngest child, Alexandra, was a senior in high 
school, practically on her way to college. I knew that my male colleagues had 
come when they were 30. They had a jump on me because they didn’t have 
children. I did what I wanted to do, I was blessed to have that opportunity to 
sequentially raise my family and then come to Congress, but I wanted women to 
                                                 
48 PALMER & SIMON, supra note 29, at 68. 
49 Id.  





be here in greater numbers at an earlier age, so that their seniority would start to 
count much sooner.52  
 
Other women who have served as elected officials have the same impression as 
Congresswoman Pelosi regarding the inability to be both a mother and a Congresswoman. As 
former Congresswoman Pat Schroeder summarized, female politicians in the 1970s had two 
career tracks, “[Congress] was either a capstone at the end of a career for those with grown 
children, or it was the career for unmarried or childless women. You could have a career or a 
family, or maybe a career after your family was grown. But rearing a family while in Congress 
was unheard of.”53 However, for many Congresswomen, the perception that Congress is not for 
mothers has not changed since the 1970s. As Congresswoman Jane Harman explained, “The 
schedule is the pits. There is absolutely no way to be a full-time parent and serve in Congress.”54  
Political scientists have also identified the sociocultural expectation that women are the 
primary caretakers of children as a leading reason for the exclusion of women from elite level 
                                                 
52 Seung Min Kim, Russert Age Question Irritates Pelosi, POLITICO (Nov. 14, 2012),  
http://www.politico.com/blogs/on-congress/2012/11/pelosi-reacts-to-russert-age-question-149540.html.  
Concerns similar to Pelosi’s regarding her family are representative of issues not that not only women considering 
entering national politics face, but  all the way down to local office. For example, Beverly Moore, former mayor of 
Kalamazoo, Michigan, said she had to be talked into running for local office: “At the time, I had not even thought 
about entering into any kind of politics. I had children in the school system.”  C. Allen Alexander in SOCIAL 
CHANGES IN WESTERN MICHIGAN, 1930 TO 1992: ALEXANDER ORAL HISTORY PROJECT, ed. 123-32 (1997).  
However, other female politicians say they no longer feel that a political career and raising a family are mutually 
exclusive. Representative Wasserman Schultz said: “It’s important to have moms in Congress….I want to show 
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politics.55 Similarly, the Citizen Political Ambition Study (CPAS), conducted in 2002, also 
provides parallel survey insight regarding women’s consideration of family issues and their 
initial decisions to run for office.56 One of the most striking findings of the CPAS was the impact 
of family and domestic responsibilities on the candidate’s decision to run for office. For men, 
there was no relationship between the household division of labor and their likelihood to 
consider running for office.57 For women on the other hand, as housework and childcare 
responsibilities increased, the likelihood they would consider running for office declined.58 
When a woman thinks about running for office, she often considers her qualifications and impact 
on her family. When a man considers the question, he often only considers whether he wants to 
run.59 
C. The Importance of Age Qualifications: In Politics, Seniority is Power 
The data regarding female candidates’ later entry into federal political office than their 
male counterparts becomes troubling when one considers the political consequences of 
candidates running later in life. In Washington, political tenure translates to political power.60 As 
one author explained, “in no other place, perhaps, does seniority or length of service carry so 
much weight as it does in the Congress of the United States.”61 The entire leadership structure of 
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Congress revolves around longevity and seniority. Seniority acts as a means of choosing 
committee chairpersons and assigning members to committees and subcommittees.62 
Additionally, tenure in Congress affects the deference shown to legislators, the assignment of 
office space, and even invitations to private dinners and social events.63 In Congress, seniority is 
the “spirit pervading the total behavior of Congress.”64 In this way, the seniority system places 
an emphasis on congressional experience and longevity.  
A quick glance at House committee leadership demonstrates the value of lengthy careers. 
For example, in the 110th Congress, among the twenty two chairs of the standing House 
committees, the average number of terms served was 13.7 years.65 In this way, seniority 
translates to leadership positions. However, until recently, women have barely been represented 
in this leadership hierarchy of Congress. For example, in the history of Congress, only seventeen 
women have chaired standing committees.66 The wake of the 2006 election saw the installation 
of Speaker Nancy Pelosi, and the subsequent 110th Congress did see a substantial increase in the 
number of women in leadership positions.67 However, despite these gains following Speaker 
Pelosi’s ascension, women continue to be underrepresented in leadership positions in Congress. 
Aside from these issues of leadership and seniority in Congress, age upon entering 
politics also can influence a candidate’s ability to get elected. Structural barriers, most notably 
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the incumbency advantage, inhibit electoral opportunities for previously excluded groups and 
limit the pace at which they can make substantial gains.68 So those who enter politics later, such 
as women, are likely to face repeat-incumbent politicians in elections who have advantages they 
received by virtue of being elected earlier in their careers. 
Beyond leadership positions in Congress and the ability to get elected, the Legislature is 
also seen as a political springboard to higher federal honors. The importance of entering politics 
at a young age becomes even more important given that thirteen of the nation’s last twenty 
presidents first ran for elective office before they reached the age of thirty five.69 Given these 
trends, it seems safe to predict that future presidents, senators and governors can be found among 
today’s young elected officials. If this is the case, it is important to understand who the people 
are that are running for office at a young age. As the data demonstrates, at least for the current 
Congress, those people are largely men. If the younger members of Congress today are the future 




                                                 
68 See, generally BARBARA BURRELL, A WOMAN’S PLACE IS IN THE HOUSE: CAMPAIGNING FOR CONGRESS IN THE 
FEMINIST ERA (1996); Richard Fox & Jennifer Lawless, Barefoot and Pregnant, or Ready to be President? 
Gender, Family Roles, and Political Ambition in the 21st Century, Paper presented at the annual meeting of the 
American Political Science Association, Seattle, WA: September 1 – 4, 2011; David Nixon & R. Darcy, Special 
Elections and the Growth of Women’s Representation in the House of Representatives 16 WOMEN & POLITICS 96, 
96-107 (1996). 
69 Ruth Mandel & Katherine Kleeman, Political Generation Next: America’s Young Elected Leaders 7(2004). These 
Presidents are: William McKinley (U.S. House of Representatives, 34) ; Theodore Roosevelt (State Assembly, NY, 
24), William H. Taft (Superior Court Judge, OH, 31),Warren G. Harding (State Senate, OH, 35), Calvin Coolidge 
(Councilman, Northampton, MA, 26); Franklin D. Roosevelt (State Senate, NY, 28), John Kennedy (U.S. House of 
Representatives, 30) Lyndon B. Johnson (U.S. House of Representatives, 29); Richard M. Nixon (U.S. House of 
Representatives, 34); Gerald Ford (U.S. House of Representatives, 35); Jimmy Carter (Board of Education, Sumter 




D. A Modern Egalitarian Rationale for the Constitution’s Minimum Age 
Requirements: Discouraging Gendered Capture of Federal Political Office  
 
Although some argue minimum age requirements limit democratic choice, they also serve 
an important egalitarian function in today’s society where women enter politics later in life.  
Examining the populist purposes of the minimum age requirements at the time of the 
Constitution’s ratification help illuminate the continued importance of the minimum age 
requirements today. At ratification, the eligibility qualifications served populist goals because 
aristocratic entrenchment of political office was a major threat to America’s fledgling 
democracy. That is, the age qualifications reflect an immense aversion to the custom in early 
America of lineal succession of government office from fathers to sons.70  
Professor Akhil Amar describes the goals of the eligibility qualifications as the promotion 
of a “democratic culture of republican merit and equal opportunity.”71 At the nation’s Founding, 
the eligibility requirements promoted equal opportunity because they limited the premature 
elevation of “favorite sons” to political office, and in this way the age requirements embodied 
republican principles.72 As Professor Amar explains, “Without a minimum-age rule, voters and 
legislature in each state might be tempted to send the state’s favorite son, such as the governor’s 
scion, to Congress as young as possible.”73 Allowing young men to run for office at earlier ages 
could lead to a “republican race to the bottom,” where states competed with each other to elect 
Congressmen younger and younger so they could obtain more power in Congress.74 The 
“haughty heirs of distinguished names” that would be famous enough to win a seat in Congress 
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at a very young age would have a springboard to further federal honors.75 The Constitution’s age 
qualifications thus ensure that each generation’s “low born” individuals have the time they need 
to display their own merit and virtue before their well-born counterparts run for office based on 
family reputation or wealth. In this way, the Framers designed the minimum age qualifications to 
grow a republican society open to meritorious people of humble origins.76 
This same populist rationale for preventing favorite-born sons from amassing power too 
soon in Washington can also be applied in the context of women in Congress today. Just as the 
Drafters were concerned that favorite aristocratic sons would create political dynasties, given 
women’s later entry into politics, a Constitution without minimum age requirements literally 
could encourage favorite sons, not daughters, to ascend in politics. While women enter politics 
later, potentially due to domestic concerns such as child-rearing and raising a family, their male 
counterparts would begin amassing federal honors and positions of leadership within political 
institutions at much younger ages.  In a system where seniority is power, it is not difficult to 
imagine the effects of opening federal office to younger candidates: men, who traditionally are 
the young candidates who are able and willing to enter politics, will continue to ascend. If 
elected young, the incumbent advantage will benefit them more and more, and committee 
leadership will be within their grasp. If the Constitution’s minimum age requirements were 
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eliminated, it is likely that a disproportionate amount of men would be able to participate in this 
“republican race to the bottom,” while women continue to seek election later in life.   
These analogies between the Constitution’s allowing for the political advancement of 
sons of humble origins in 1787 and women more generally today are even more salient when 
read through the lens of the Nineteenth Amendment. Reasoning about the Constitution, which 
now includes the 19th Amendment, alters how we understand questions of equal citizenship for 
women. The Nineteenth Amendment was the product of the revolutionary idea that women have 
equal status in a democracy, and brought women into political citizenship after centuries of 
exclusion by men.77 Although some legal scholars, including David Strauss, have opined that the 
Nineteenth Amendment is “irrelevant,”78 many legal scholars argue the Nineteenth Amendment 
stands not only for women’s voting rights, but also for “full rights of political participation” for 
women.79 This interpretive framework reads the Nineteenth Amendment as embracing a certain 
background understanding of civil and political rights for women.  
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Applying this interpretive framework that is cognizant of the Nineteenth Amendment, 
Professor Amar argues that the Nineteenth Amendment works as an estoppel argument, in that 
“[c]ertain arguments about the difference between the sexes that might have been 
constitutionally permissible, as justifying differential treatment before the Nineteenth 
Amendment, are, as a matter of law, precluded by the affirmation of political equality in the 
Nineteenth Amendment itself.”80 Although a lack of minimum age qualifications in the 
Constitution would likely not constitute “differential treatment” for women as the age limitations 
would exist for both genders, the continued presence of age qualifications in our Constitution 
helps to underline and affirm the political equality of women political candidates and their 
familial concerns. Reva Siegel explains the transformative nature of the Nineteenth Amendment 
as it relates to family issues:  
When Americans finally voted to ratify the Nineteenth Amendment, they were 
breaking with understandings of the family that had organized public and private 
law and defined the position of the sexes since the founding of the republic. The 
history of women’s struggle for enfranchisement thus teaches that equal 
citizenship for women includes freedom from subordination in or through the 
family.81 
 
The Nineteenth Amendment is about women’s equal political participation, and reading 
the age qualifications through the lens of the Nineteenth Amendment illuminates the importance 
of this constitutional feature in promoting and protecting women’s political participation as 
federal officeholders. Women today have equal voice and representation, and our Constitution 
must now be construed with attention to this equality and the awareness of women’s political 
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exclusion in earlier centuries.82 In this way, the Nineteenth Amendment gives new effect to the 
text of the Constitution’s minimum age qualifications as they relate to women specifically.  
The constitution’s minimum age qualifications help promote women in positions of 
leadership in a strongly egalitarian fashion, just as the age qualifications originally promoted 
leaders from humble origins. The cumulative data on women in the 113th Congress, along with 
more general trends in Congress, suggest that the Constitution’s age qualifications can not only 
dampen the intergenerational “aristocracy,” the Framers intended to suppress, but also this form 
of gendered “aristocracy.” If women wait until later in life to first run for political office, as the 
data demonstrates, an abolishment of the minimum age requirements for office would likely 
further widen the gap between men and women in positions of Congressional leadership.  
IV. CONCLUSION 
Women candidates’ delay in taking office, like any candidate’s delay in office, can affect 
their ability to gain power and future leadership positions in the legislature. A focus on the 
modern and unintended potential effects of minimum age qualifications in the Constitution fits 
into a larger democratic, egalitarian pattern of our Constitution’s features, especially since the 
adoption of the Nineteenth Amendment. The elective mode of obtaining rulers is the 
characteristic policy of republican government. If women political candidates in our government 
do systematically delay entering politics until later in life compared to their male counterparts, 
then the Constitution’s minimum age requirements can be seen as one means of promoting 
greater gender parity in Congress.  
Although the age qualifications continue to promote mature and wise candidates for 
federal office, reflections on the Constitution’s framing and ratification also remind us that the 
eligibility requirements in the Constitution were created to encourage the egalitarian promotion 
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of political leaders. The Framers and ratifiers of the Constitution had a deep disdain for elevating 
high-born sons of famous aristocratic families to office at the expense of those born to less well-
to-do families who were unable to be elected at such a young age. But sons of poor fathers aren’t 
the only group who might be unable to run for office or be elected young. Today, the 
Constitution continues to protect those who would be unable to enter politics at a young age: 
namely, women.  
The ability of women to enter politics and obtain leadership positions is not just a 
procedural issue, but potentially has substantive effects too for our system of government. 
Elected officials make a difference in the issues they prioritize, the committees they chair, the 
bills they sponsor and cosponsor, and the output they generate. Studies indicate policy 
differences between male and female elected officials. For example, female legislators are more 
likely than men to vote for reproductive rights role change legislation83 and pursue policies 
related to women’s issues.84 Additionally, women who replace men in the same U.S. House 
district sponsor relatively more legislation that pertains to women’s issues.85 Women state 
legislators also hold more liberal preferences on welfare policy than men, even when controlling 
for constituency preferences and party ideology.86   
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Given the importance of seniority in the hierarchy in Congress for acquiring leadership 
positions and influence, the constitutional minimum age requirements can be viewed from a 
modern lens as one means of preventing political capture of the highest federal positions by one 
gender. If the Constitution’s minimum age qualifications in Articles I and II were abolished, as 
some reform groups have advocated for, this abolishment may further restrict the ability for 
equally credentialed women to emerge from the candidate eligibility pool, run for office, win 
their races, and obtain leadership positions in Congress. The Nineteenth Amendment today 
highlights the importance of promoting women’s political participation, and gives new meaning 
to the minimum age qualifications.  The requirements for age, residency, and citizenship stand 
today as the foundational qualifications for office holding, and should continue to stand in the 
Constitution. The age qualifications, while fulfilling their original purpose of ensuring that 
mature and wise candidates serve in office, also serve the egalitarian function of allowing more 
female participation in the highest federal offices. 
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